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THE VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT BUST: DID
AGENCY COSTS PLAY A ROLE? WAS IT SOMETHING
LAWYERS HELPED STRUCTURE?
JOSEPH BANKMAN* AND MARCUS COLE**
INTRODUCTION
The rise of the venture capital industry has attracted the at-
tention of a wide array of scholars. Scholars in the Law and
Economics tradition have focused on the legal structure of start-up
corporations backed by venture capital funds and explained that the
corporations' structure is a response to the problem of agency costs.'
Venture capitalists possess expertise and information that their
individual and institutional investors lack. These investors hire the
venture capitalists to select investments and monitor the behavior of
the managers/entrepreneurs of the start-ups. Venture capitalists
possess the power, through the corporate charter, to remove
managers at will. The "carrot" of stock options motivates the
managers, but they are worried about the "stick" that the venture
capitalists wield as monitors. Perhaps more significantly, managers
must repeatedly return to the venture capitalists for funding. Venture
capitalists are restrained from abusing their power over entrepreneurs
because they must relinquish their monitoring role after an initial
public offering.2 Additionally, venture capitalists are restrained from
abusing their power in two ways: by the requirement that the venture
* Ralph M. Parsons Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School.
** Associate Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. We thank Richard Brooks, Richard
Craswell, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Ron Gilson, Joseph Grundfest, Michael Klausner,
Robert Sitkoff, Richard Steinberg, Jeff Strand, and participants in the Northwestern University
School of Law Faculty Workshop, and the Stanford Law School Faculty Workshop for their
thoughtful comments and suggestions.
1. There is a substantial body of literature on this subject, dating back as least as far as
William A. Sahiman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 473 (1990); see also PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL
CYCLE (1999); Anat R. Admati and Paul Pfleiderer, Robust Financial Contracting and the Role
of Venture Capitalists, 49 J. FIN. 371 (1994); Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring
and the Staging of Venture Capital, 50 J. FIN. 146 (1995); Josh Lerner, Venture Capitalists and the
Oversight of Public Firms, 50 J. FIN. 301 (1995).
2. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243 (1998).
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capitalist must return to the market repeatedly for funds and thereby
face reputational consequences for misbehavior, and by the
contingent nature of the venture capitalist's compensation.
The literature on this subject dates back over a decade, during
which time venture capital funds have experienced good and bad
times. The bulk of the literature has been written in the past seven
years, however, at a time when venture capital-backed investments
realized extraordinary returns. Perhaps because this literature has
been written against a backdrop of prosperity, it tends to emphasize
the strong points of the venture capitalists' organizational and legal
structure.
Venture capital-backed investments continue to offer extraordi-
nary returns, but now the returns are extraordinarily poor. These
investments are not marked to the market at regular intervals, so an
"apples-to-apples" comparison with publicly traded investments is
not possible. It is generally believed, however, that venture capital-
backed investments have declined in value at least as much as the
NASDAQ, or indices such as the CBOE Technology Index.
Moreover, because of the nature of venture capital investments, this
decline is unlikely to reverse itself in time to help current investors.
The staged nature of venture capital financing, described below,
leaves start-ups with only enough funds to operate for a relatively
short period of time. Some of the approximately $150 billion invested
by venture capitalists in the past two years has already been spent on
companies that have been unable to raise funding needed for further
operations.3 These companies have simply disappeared, and along
with them, so has their investors' money. Virtually all of the
remaining companies will require further funds within a year or so.
The public markets are not supplying financing through initial public
offerings; public companies have cut back or eliminated acquisition
programs, and the flow of investment into the venture capital firms
and the flow of investment from these firms to start-ups has slowed
noticeably. 4 Only the most successful start-ups may be able to obtain
3. According to Venture Economics and the National Venture Capital Association,
venture capital investments were slightly under $65 billion in 1999 and slightly over $100 billion
in 2000. Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, National Venture Capital Profile for United States, at
http://www.ventureeconomics.com/vec/stats/2000q4/us.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2001).
4. Venture capital commitments from investors dropped 32 percent from fourth quarter
2000 to first quarter 2001, and amounts invested by venture capital firms to start-ups fell
approximately 45 percent. Press Release, Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, Venture Capital
Fundraising Declines in Q1, While Average Fund Size Increases (May 15, 2001), available at
http://www.nvca.org/VEpress05-l501.htm.
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funding, and the market value of the remaining companies in the field
may fall to liquidation value.
What makes this decline particularly interesting is that it did not
come as a surprise to the venture capital community. Venture capital
investments increased dramatically during the period between 1990
and 2000.1 The number of investment opportunities did not increase
by a similar percentage, however. The predictable effect of the
sudden influx of funds was a diminution in quality of investments and
an increase in investment valuations/cost. By the end of 1999, many
venture capitalists and industry observers publicly predicted poor
returns for the industry in general, if not for their own investments. 6
A commonplace sentiment was that, in the words of one industry
observer, the "low hanging fruit" had already been picked, and the
remaining fruit could not be profitably harvested. Yet the venture
capitalists continued to invest.
More money was invested in the last two quarters in the year
2000 than was raised by venture capitalists in the first seven years of
the decade.7 What explains that investment? Was there something in
the nature of the contract between venture capitalists and their
investors that encouraged overinvestment?
We put these questions to several venture capitalists, investors,
lawyers, entrepreneurs, and other industry observers. We have tried
to include virtually every explanation given by every venture
capitalist we interviewed, and to integrate their explanations with
facts and related theories. We have done this because (to give away
our conclusion) we feel that there is no single "correct" explanation
5. Funds raised by venture capital firms increased from $3.4 billion in 1990 to more than
$100 billion in 2000. Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, Latest Industry Statistics, at
http://www.nvca.org/ffax.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2001).
6. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, High-Tech Anxiety Hits Silicon Valley; Innovation Capital
Waits for the Bubble to Burst, WASH. POST, Dec. 25,1999, at Al, available at 1999 WL 30310352.
7. $45.8 billion was invested in the last two quarters in 2000 as against $43.3 billion raised
in 1990-1996. See Press Release, Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, Venture Capital Investment
Activity Returns to 1999 Levels (May 2, 2001), available at http://www.nvca.org/
nvca05 02 Ola.html; Press Release, Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, Venture Capital Fundraising
Slows in Fourth Quarter, but Hits New Record for the Year (Feb. 22 ,2001), available at
http://www.nvca.orgVEpress02_23_01.htm. In any given year, the amounts raised and invested
by venture capital firms may vary; over a large number of years, however, the amounts should
be roughly consistent. Venture capital investments are defined differently by different
organizations, but all statistics show that year 2000 investments dwarfed those of previous years.
See, e.g., Beacon Mgmt., Venture Capital Statistics, at http://www. beaconmgmt.coml
Corporate FinanceNentureCapitalStatistics/venture capital-statistics.htm (last visited Aug.
2, 2001) (showing venture capital investments for the following years, in billions of dollars: 6.3 in
1995; 9.1 in 1996; 11.4 in 1997; 15.1 in 1998; 38.2 in 1999; and 68.8 in 2000).
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for last year's overinvestment, and that we learn something from
almost any explanation. We have tried to group related explanations
and demonstrate the analytical or empirical difficulties with some of
the more unlikely ones. In an effort to promote frankness and candor,
we promised interviewees confidentiality, and guaranteed anonymity
in all quotations appearing in this Article.8
In Part I, we provide background information on the structure of
venture capital-funded investments. In Part II, we discuss some
explanations for continued investment that do not implicate agency
costs. One explanation is that venture capitalists did not believe that
the market, or at least their investment, was overvalued. Another
explanation is that venture capitalists regarded the decision to invest
funds as that of an investor, while their job was simply to optimize
return subject to this decision. Some who hold this view feel the
investors were misinformed, while others think that the investors
followed a "greater fool" theory, in which they would be able to sell
their investments at a profit to less sophisticated retail investors
through an initial public offering. A final explanation is that the
venture capitalist's decision to invest was driven by a desire to
maintain reputation among entrepreneurs and skilled technology
workers. This fear of "reputational loss" does not implicate agency
costs. Investors in one fund are apt to be investors in a later fund,
and so they share the reputation-related gains from current
investments.
In Part III, we discuss (and for the most part reject) explanations
for investment based on herd behavior or cognitive biases. In Part
IV, we develop an agency cost explanation for investments. The
unprecedented flow of funds into the sector in 2000 offered venture
capitalists a huge upside in the form of "carry" on future profits, and
significant guaranteed income in the form of management fees. Many
venture capitalists expressed the opinion that for venture capitalists
other than themselves, the presence of this private gain distorted
decision making.
Assumptions as to future investor behavior are different for the
agency hypothesis than for the reputational loss hypothesis we discuss
in Part II. The investment boom in 1998-2000 is seen as a one-time
8. Venture capitalists and other industry actors are often reluctant to talk frankly about
industry practices, particularly with respect to practices that may have produced the boom-bust
cycle. Many, in fact, specifically insisted upon assurances of anonymity and confidentiality
before agreeing to speak with us.
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aberration. Investment in future years is seen as very low, even for
venture capitalists who correctly predicted a down market and
avoided investing at the peak. Venture capitalists who optimized
private gain by overinvesting in 2000 realized subnormal returns on
that investment and suffered a loss of reputation among investors.
The significance of that reputational loss is minimized by the low
investment pool available in later years. In game theoretic terms,
some venture capitalists felt that a multiperiod game had devolved
into a one-period game, and acted accordingly.
Our description of agency costs in Part IV is consistent with
financial literature on this subject. Our hypothesis that investment
(measured from an ex ante perspective) was not optimal but was
distorted by agency costs is broadly consistent with Kaplan and
Stein's description about an earlier "boom-bust" cycle in the
leveraged buy-out craze of the 1980s.
Our hypothesis that agency costs play a role in soliciting or
accepting funds is also similar in many respects to Paul Gompers's
hypothesis that agency costs cause less well-established venture
capitalists to "grandstand" and take companies public too early in
order to obtain new funds.9 Not surprisingly, the policy recommen-
dations that flow from this hypothesis are similar to those suggested
by Gompers.
Under the most plausible variant of the agency cost hypothesis,
well-established venture capitalists believe they will be able to
continue to raise funds in future years. These firms are concerned
with reputation effects that stem from overinvestment, and so are
likely to reduce funding when valuations seem excessive. Newly
established venture capitalists have less of a reputation to lose, and
attract less-sophisticated investors who are more likely to be short-
term investors. These predominantly newly established venture
capitalists behave as if they are in a one-period game.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF VENTURE CAPITAL-BACKED
INVESTMENTS
While there is great variation throughout the world of venture
capital finance with regard to the structure of venture capital firms
and investment vehicles, most structures are based upon a fairly
9. Paul A. Gompers, Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 133
(1996).
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simple standard form.10 The venture capital firm solicits investors by
issuing a prospectus detailing the purpose and scope of the fund to be
raised and the nature of the investments sought." The prospectus
also details the legal form that will govern the relationship between
the venture capital firm and the fund participants (i.e., investors).
The legal form most characteristic of venture investing is the limited
partnership. 12 The venture capital firm acts as the general partner of
the limited partnership, responsible for management of the fund and
all investment decisions involving disposition of the fund's assets. For
these responsibilities the venture capital firm receives an annual
management fee, typically two to three percent of the total capitali-
zation of the fund. 3 In addition, the venture capital firm will
command a "carry"-a percentage of the fund's equity share of any
portfolio investments-in the range of 15 to 35 percent.14
The remaining share of any fund investments is held by the
limited partners on a pro rata share basis. An investor becomes a
limited partner by "subscribing" to one or more shares of the fund at
issue. Subscriptions are obtained by agreeing to a capital call
commitment. Under a capital call commitment, limited partners are
obligated to forward specified amounts of capital whenever the
general partners issue a capital call.15 Funds establish a timetable for
regular capital contributions over a designated period of time,
typically two years, with contributions being made quarterly. 6 The
schedule of regular capital calls is designed to result in the raising of
the fund's articulated capital goal. 7
The limited partnerships are not just limited as far as legal liabil-
ity-they can be quite limited in number, too. Participation in funds
managed by the most well-established and prestigious venture capital
10. See Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of
Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & ECON. 463, 469 (1996); Sahlman, supra note 1, at
487-93.
11. See Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, The Venture Capital Industry: Commitments and Fund
Raising, at http://www.nvca.org/def.html (last visited May 13, 2001).
12. GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 1, at 8; Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, The Venture
Capital Industry: Types of Firms, at http://www.nvca.org/def.html (last visited May 13, 2001).
13. Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, An Analysis of Compensation in the U.S. Venture Capital
Partnership, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 6, 20-23 (1999).
14. Id. at 14-20 (observing that most funds have a carried interest of 20 percent).
15. JOSH LERNER, A NOTE ON PRIVATE EQUITY PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS 2 (Harvard
Bus. Sch., Case Note No. 9-294-084, 1998); Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, The Venture Capital
Industry: Capital Calls, at http://www.nvca.org/def.html (last visited May 13, 2001).
16. LERNER, supra note 15, at 2 (noting that all funds are typically drawn down fully
between the second and fourth anniversaries of the fund's formation).
17. Id.; Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, supra note 15.
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firms is limited to a select number of investors, all of whom "qualify"
for the privilege to subscribe by meeting the venture capital firm's
strict standards for participation. 18 Even when an investor satisfies
the firm's criteria, elite funds are typically oversubscribed. 19
Preference is given to investors in the firm's previous offerings. For
example, an investor can realistically hope to participate in next
year's Mayfield fund only if she subscribed to this year's fund.20
Limited partners tend to share certain characteristics. They are
typically institutional investors, such as pension funds or wealthy
individuals who meet strict participation requirements.21  Many
venture capital firms will raise "side-by-side" funds comprised of
investors grouped by similarity of characteristics. These side-by-side
funds might include an "entrepreneurs' fund," comprised of limited
partners who were themselves successful entrepreneurs, with an
interest in steering opportunities toward the partnership. Side-by-
side structures typically involve an institutional investors' fund,
constituting 90 percent of the assets available for investment, with an
entrepreneur fund presence supplying the remaining 10 percent.2
These side-by-side funds are then treated as one fund for investment
purposes. In other words, when the main fund invests in an
enterprise, all side-by-side funds participate in the investment
proportionately. 23
The common structure of venture investment isolates the inter-
ests of any given fund's investors from those of past and future funds,
though this is softened by implicit norms of reinvestment at similar
terms. The agreement between investors and venture capitalists
creates agency costs (principally management fees but to some extent
the option value of the carry). We discuss these costs in Part IV, as a
partial explanation of the investment boom-bust, but first we discuss
non-agency cost explanations for investment behavior.
18. GEORGE W. FENN Er AL., THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET 36
(Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Staff Studies Series No. 168, 1995).
19. Id. at 36 n.88 (discussing oversubscription of Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers).
20. See id. at 36; Gompers, supra note 9, at 137.
21. JOSH LERNER, A NOTE ON THE PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDRAISING PROCESS 1-2
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Case Note No. N9-201-042, 2000); FENN Er AL., supra note 18, at 45-49.
22. LERNER, supra note 21, at 2.
23. Id.
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II. NON-AGENCY COST EXPLANATIONS FOR INVESTMENT
A. No Perceived Overvaluation
One obvious explanation for why venture capitalists invested in
2000 is that the investments seemed to be good ones. The fact that
the investments turned out poorly does not necessarily suggest that
the venture capitalists, as agents, were conflicted. It may simply tell
us that, like investors in markets everywhere, the venture capital
community failed to see a downturn coming. Certainly some venture
capitalists interviewed made statements consistent with that
explanation. When asked why so many investments were made at
such high valuations, one venture capitalist said, "Some people were
stupid and blind-and I was one of them." A related explanation is
that certain venture capitalists felt that investments were in general
overvalued, but that they were able to pick undervalued investments.
Another venture capitalist bluntly said when asked the "why did you
invest" question, "My - didn't stink."
B. Deference to Investor Determinations of Portfolio Allocation
Another explanation given for continued investment is that
venture capitalists felt the decision to invest in venture capital must
be made by the investor; the venture capitalist's job is simply to
optimize return subject to that decision. Investors in traditional
venture capital funds are either high net worth individuals or
institutional investors.24 It may be presumed that these investors are
sophisticated and have made an independent decision as to how to
allocate their investment portfolio. Venture capitalists under-
standably point to this sophistication to justify investing even during
times of perceived high prices and lower returns. Venture capitalists
express a similar attitude when asked whether they considered simply
holding funds already collected or pledged because of pending
decline in the market. As one venture capitalist stated, "Investors
have given us funds to invest in technology, not T-bills." This
24. In recent years, corporations have supplied significant funding for technology-related
start-ups. This funding differs from traditional funding in that it almost always has "strategic"
benefits for the corporate investor (e.g., a wireless messaging start-up funded by a
telecommunications company) and is often carried out "in-house" by a venture capital
department. At least some corporations, however, have "outsourced" this type of investment to
venture capitalists. See, e.g., Atrium Capital, Corporate Partners, at http://www.
atriumcapital.com/indexcorporatepartners.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2001).
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explanation of the "investor's portfolio allocation" is related to the
theory that venture capitalists are rationally concerned only with
performance relative to other venture capitalists-a theory that we
discuss in Part III.
It is important to point out the limitations of, as well as intuition
behind, the investor's portfolio allocation explanation. It would
appear to be in neither the venture capitalists' nor the investors'
interest to have the allocation decision made without the input from
the venture capitalist. One would expect venture capitalists to have a
level of expertise in their field that is not shared by fund managers or
sophisticated individuals. This expertise underlies and justifies the
role of the venture capitalist. The belief that venture capitalists
would have expertise in choosing among investments but no useful
input to add as to the absolute or relative merits of those investments,
as against investments in other sectors, is somewhat extreme. A
venture capitalist who felt the market was overvalued might tell his
investors to wait or at least to be prepared for subpar returns. Few, if
any, appeared to have made this ex ante disclosure. A venture
capitalist that did not make this disclosure might similarly ignore the
investor's portfolio allocation decision if it felt strongly enough that
the market was overvalued. A policy of underinvestment would
garner the venture capitalist a superior return relative to its peers.
It's possible that an institutional investor would rank venture
capitalists only by the return per dollar invested. Still, it seems likely
that a venture capitalist who predicted a downturn would gain
reputation among current and past investors. These investors would
readily forgive a venture capitalist who overrode their decision to buy
in an overheated market. One might suspect, therefore, that a
venture capitalist who placed a high value on reputation would be less
likely to adhere to the norm of sector neutrality.25
A final point on investor's portfolio allocation theory is that the
peculiar rules and methods on allocation were a prime contributor to
the boom-bust cycle in the industry. Institutional investors such as
endowments and pension plans often prohibit investments that are
too small to justify time and transaction costs, or investments in which
25. The agency cost hypothesis we offer in Part IV, infra, assumes that future investment is
predicted to be low, at least for less well-established firms. Low future investment encourages
agent opportunism by making reputation less important. The same assumption-low future
investment-would support sector allocation neutrality by reducing reputation-related gains for
those venture capitalists who are willing to tell investors that the sector is overvalued or increase
returns by maintaining a high cash position in times of overvaluation.
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the institution will comprise too large a percentage of total funding.
Thus, a fund might prohibit investments below $5 million or
contributing more than 20 percent of funds to any investment.
Until recently, most venture funds were too small to justify in-
vestments under these criteria. Institutional investors provisionally
allocated funds to venture capital that, due to these restrictions, could
not be invested. The rise in size of the venture funds opened the field
for institutional investors, and that, as much as anything, created the
huge demand for investments and excessive valuations, which led to
the recent bust. In referring to these previously binding restrictions
on investments, one venture capitalist stated, "If you push on a door
for years and years and all of a sudden it opens, odds are you'll fall on
your face."
C. The Greater Fool Theory
The focus of the investor's portfolio allocation explanation is on
venture capitalists and their acceptance of their investors' decisions.
No motivation is ascribed to investors, though it is presumed they are
misinformed. An alternative explanation, given by several venture
capitalists, is that investors knew that the market was overheated and
that they were buying in at high valuations. They were willing and
eager to do so, however, because their investment would ultimately
be "unloaded" upon less-informed investors in the public markets.
With virtually no limit to the appetite of the IPO market, and the
historically unprecedented rise in post-IPO stock values, venture
capital firms could continue to justify investment despite weaknesses
in underlying business models.
D. Reputation
A venture capitalist's chief asset (apart from human capital) is its
reputation, and an important component of reputation is its standing
among the overlapping groups of entrepreneurs and technologically
skilled workers. Many venture capitalists interviewed felt that
absenting themselves from the marketplace would cause a certain
reputational loss. "You can't call yourself a venture capitalist and at
the same time tell everyone you're not making any investments," said
[Vol. 77:211
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one venture capitalist. "That would be like calling yourself a car
salesman when you don't sell cars. No one will take you seriously."
Reputational loss would stem, in particular, from instances in
which the venture capitalist had served as the lead investor for a
company but would now decline to provide follow-up financing. This
behavior might well doom the company-not only because it would
deprive the company of a likely source of funds, but also because it
would send a no-confidence signal to other investors.26
The venture capitalist would acquire a reputation for not sup-
porting its portfolio companies. This would make it hard to attract
entrepreneurs and existing companies to their portfolio, and to attract
employees to their existing portfolio companies. More speculatively,
the venture capitalist's failure to compete in the marketplace for
initial financing might lead entrepreneurs to dismiss the venture
capitalist as a source of financing. This reputation might remain even
in later periods in which the venture capitalist wished to invest.
If implicit contracts are ignored, reputation-based decisions that
made sense for a venture capitalist would not necessarily be in the
interest of its investors. Investors who fund venture capital
investments do so through limited partnerships or limited liability
companies. They do not receive an interest in all future investments
of a venture capitalist, merely in the investments made with a
particular limited partnership. A particular limited partnership may
fund a year or so worth of investments, while subsequent investments
will be funded by a new limited partnership.
In effect, investment in a limited partnership gives the investor
only a temporary interest in the venture capitalist's profits. Profits
realized after that temporary interest go to the venture capitalist and
the next set of investors. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the
next partnership will be offered on the same terms as the last
partnership. One of the most important changes in the past year has
been the increase in management fees charged by venture capitalists;
this fee is up 50 percent, from 2 percent to 3 percent. At first glance,
this suggests that today's investors are charged for a benefit that goes
to tomorrow's investors. This problem is not faced in corporate
26. The strength of the no-confidence signal would be lessened to the extent the venture
capitalist made it clear that it was directed at the market in general rather than a particular
company; but the net effect of a lead investor in an earlier round refusing to provide follow-up
financing would be negative.
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investments, since today's shareholders have the right to participate
in tomorrow's investments.
In fact, the venture capitalist's pricing of current and future
investments may already take into account a lesser return to
investors. There is an excess of demand over supply for slots in first-
tier venture capitalist investment partnerships. Venture capitalists
are not charging "what the market will bear" and in return are
requiring a certain degree of loyalty from their investors. This is what
we may infer from the reaction of the fund manager of an insti-
tutional investor that has been one of the leading sources of venture
capitalist financing over the years. "We might well have turned down
some of the recent investment opportunities on the grounds the
market was overvalued. But if you don't invest in Kleiner, Perkins
Fund 22 and 23, you lose the right to invest in Fund 24." It is
therefore possible to reconcile decision making that takes into
account long-term reputation with what, for want of a better term,
may be called "honest agency." Venture capitalists invest in what
they suspect to be an overheated market in part to maintain
reputation. The investors know they are paying to maintain the
venture capitalist's position in the marketplace; they do so because it
gives them the ability to invest in the future when they believe slots
will be limited.
Is it sensible to overpay to maintain a reputation? This is
ultimately an empirical question. What follows are a number of
reasons why, as an analytic matter, this explanation may not be as
convincing as it first appears. First, if by reputation one means simply
a reputation for being a significant and successful investor, it is
unclear why a temporary absence from the marketplace would reduce
reputation. Second, reputations are to a great extent based on past
successes, and success is measured by returns to investors. So a set of
poor returns hurts a venture capitalist by reducing reputation to
investors. All else being equal, poor returns hurt a venture
capitalist's reputation among entrepreneurs as well as technology
workers. This implies that funding overvalued investments ought to
reduce, rather than enhance, a reputation.
The distinction between follow-up financing for a portfolio
company and any other sort of investment may prove helpful.
Assume that we are considering only the latter category of invest-
ments. It is not clear why someone with an idea that needs funding in
March would care whether a venture capitalist funded an overvalued
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investment in November, but the reverse might be true. An
entrepreneur may favor a venture capitalist who did not participate
earlier, both because the venture capitalist presumably avoided low
returns, and because the venture capitalist may have a reputation for
being "picky" or selective about which companies to fund. Support
from these types of venture capitalists may send a signal to others as
to the relative value of the entrepreneur's company. Suppose, in
contrast, that by "participating," a venture capitalist means to support
a portfolio company only with follow-up financing. If we ignore risk
aversion, this might not change the analysis: a venture capitalist who
avoids overpaying will establish the best reputation and it is this
reputation that ought to be important for the next set of entrepre-
neurs.
Once risk aversion is factored in, it is easy to see how entrepre-
neurs and skilled employees might value a venture capitalist who
"sticks with" a company in bad times. Even in Silicon Valley, where
employee mobility is well chronicled,27 an employee will have
considerable human capital tied up in a start-up. An employee may
prefer a venture capitalist that offers a somewhat lower expected
return but is less likely to take actions that lead to a radical decline of
that human capital. The "reputational loss" explanation becomes
more credible to the extent it is confined to providing follow-up
funding to portfolio companies. Somewhat surprisingly, though,
reputational considerations are often given as justification for "seed"
financing and other investments to companies with whom the venture
capitalist has no preexisting relationship.
It is possible that the reputational loss explanation is really a
story about contacts and technical expertise. Start-ups are very often
highly technical, and the return to the venture capitalist is often
attributed to the venture capitalist's ability to advise a company in a
technical space and provide contacts within that space. The
technology field changes rapidly, and a venture capitalist that
withdrew from the field for a substantial length of time might find it
had lost its advisory edge. Whether or not a half year or so
withdrawal from the field for new investments would cost a venture
capitalist anything is unclear.
27. See ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
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III. HERD BEHAVIOR
From a distance, there is something herd-like in the conformity
of venture capitalist behavior, and venture capitalists often use herd
imagery to describe industry behavior. Venture capitalists are not the
only group to seemingly behave in a highly coordinated fashion; a
number of economists have set forth theories of "herd behavior."
David Scharfstein and Jeremy Stein (together) and Jeffrey Zwiebel
have modeled situations in which an agent is more concerned with
relative ranking than absolute result.28  These models depend
critically on asymmetrical pay-offs; the cost to the agent for
unsuccessful deviations from the herd is larger than the gain to the
agent for a successful deviation from the herd. The agent in these
models is not risk adverse. For a risk adverse agent, herd behavior
would make sense even if payoffs are symmetrically distributed
around deviation from the norm.29
Herd behavior in these models is a form of agency cost; 0 theories
of herd behavior may in practice be tethered to non-agency cost
theories of cognitive bias. Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner rely
on herd behavior and on status quo bias,31 anchoring bias,32 and
conformity bias33 to help explain conformity of corporate contracts.
Incorporating the real-world structure of venture capital into
these economic and social psychology models would be a difficult
task. Potentially, the models might explain the apparent conformity
of venture capitalist behavior-why each venture capitalist seems to
ride with the herd. These models would not, however, explain the
herd's behavior. The most that can be said in favor of this approach
28. David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. ECON.
REV. 465, 467-69 (1990); Jeffrey Zwiebel, Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation,
103 J. POL. ECON. 1, 4-6 (1995). Both articles are discussed in Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and
Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996).
29. Kahan and Klausner make a similar argument to explain conservatism in corporate
contracting. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 28, at 359-65.
30. It is not, of course, the form of agency cost one intuitively associates with corporate
managers (e.g., excessive pay or perks).
31. Status quo bias is defined as a preference for the present state and an unwillingness to
buy an object one does not have or sell an object one owns. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 28,
at 359; see also William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making,
1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
32. Anchoring bias refers to the tendency of persons to base judgments on initial reference
points. Here, of course, the initial reference points would be the existing valuations of
companies. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 28, at 362.
33. Id. at 363.
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is that it suggests that there might be a certain inertia behind any
action, and that the inertia may have made it more difficult for the
herd to change direction by scaling back its investment activities.
IV. AGENCY COST THEORIES
A. Generally
Sources of agency costs in the relationship between venture
capitalists and their investors are well documented in the literature.3 4
For our purposes, the most important of these costs is the relationship
between funds taken in and fees. As noted in Part I, venture
capitalists invest funds of the limited partnerships. The partnerships
are funded for the most part by institutional and individual investors
and managed by the venture capitalists. The venture capitalists have
historically received a 2 percent management fee, but in recent years
this fee has gone up to 3 percent. In addition, the venture capitalists
receive 20 percent of the upside on investments. With all else being
equal, the venture capitalist's gross is proportional to the amount of
money invested.
The idea that managers benefit from increased investment to
manage has a long history in corporate law, where it has been used to
explain high prices paid for corporate acquisitions." What is worth
noting here is that the temptation, in the form of increased compen-
sation, is much stronger for venture capitalists than for mangers. The
unprecedented infusion of funds in 2000 presented venture capitalists
with an opportunity to dramatically increase their compensation by
simply accepting contributions from willing investors. From the
perspective of some venture capitalists, this opportunity was too
attractive to turn down. "Everybody knew it was like a game of
musical chairs, and it was only a question of when the music stopped,"
said one venture capitalist. "But everyone wanted to get in while the
getting's good."
If the venture capitalists felt the market was overheated, return
on new funds would in one sense be disappointing. The carry that is
carved out of profits might be low or nonexistent. Even here, the
34. See, e.g., Sahiman, supra note 1, at 493-503.
35. See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 627
(1989) (recognizing the incentives for managers to engage in "empire building" by increasing
the size of the asset pool within their control).
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venture capitalist would have a different incentive than the investor.
The carry represents a free option to the venture capitalist, and the
option has value even if the expected return on the investment is
negative. For the investor, however, a negative expected return is just
that. More significantly, in the past few years, the fixed management
fees alone have become significant enough to support a high lifestyle,
even absent profits. A leading venture capitalist in 1995 may have
taken in $100 million in funds, realizing $2 million in annual
management fees. That same venture capitalist in 2000 might have
taken in $1 billion, and realized $30 million in annual management
fees because of the increase in management fees from 2 percent to 3
percent. Since staffs and expenses have not increased proportionately
with the inflow of funds, the management fee structure guaranteed
high annual returns to the venture capital firm and its partners. "A lot
of venture capitalists just got hooked on management fees," said one
venture capitalist.
It is wrong to treat the additional managerial income as simply a
no-cost boon to the venture capitalist. That simplistic assumption
would be true only for those venture capitalists who are "one-period
players." Venture capitalists who intend to raise money in the future
will be hurt by low returns today. A venture capitalist who believed
the market was overvalued, but had access to fixed dollars in the next
few investment periods, would be better off deferring the investment
to a later period. The return would be higher, and the higher return
would presumably attract more capital in subsequent periods.
Venture capitalists who believe that their colleagues put self-
interest above investor interest do not believe that investment dollars
were fixed so that deferral of investment was a viable option. Instead,
they believe that 2000 represented a huge one-time influx of funds,
and that subsequent years were apt to be not only lower than 2000,
but lower than normal. This particularly would be the case if the
market crashed. The reduction in investor interest after the crash
would offset whatever advantage the venture capitalist could get from
having sat out the last frenzied round of investments. As one venture
capitalist stated, "Even if [venture capitalists who invested in high
pre-crash prices] lost in this period of craziness, they would still be
better off than those who hadn't raised money."
Anecdotal support to this theory is also offered by another ven-
ture capitalist, who had invested successfully prior to 2000 but hadn't
invested in 2000 because of his small size and the timing of his funds
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closing. He has found it impossible now to raise additional funds. In
addition, his investors have made inquiries about reneging on
amounts already pledged. This venture capitalist believes these
investors are performing a kind of "triage"-one with an ironic twist.
Because his investors have lost funds in other investments, they are
now considering withdrawing from his limited partnership.
A belief that no funds will flow into the sector after a crash has a
perverse incentive effect for venture capitalists. The more overheated
they find the market, the more likely a crash, and the more likely a
crash, the greater the rewards for raising and investing funds in the
overheated market. In game theoretic terms, a multiperiod game
suddenly becomes a one-period game; the change is seen by one
party, which changes its behavior accordingly. All of this is not to
suggest that venture capitalists would have invested funds had they
known the market would crash. The conventional intuition that a
venture capitalist would be better off sitting out an overheated
market, however, is, at the very least, simplistic.
Add to this the realities of the general uncertainty of future
markets, or a venture capitalist's position in those markets, and the
time value of money, and one can understand one venture capitalist's
mantra, "Money now is better than money later."
B. Reputation across Venture Capital Firms
The agency hypothesis relies upon the assumption that repu-
tation costs from misinvesting are apt to be low because of the
assumed decline in future investment. It seems unlikely that all firms
would experience (or would be thought to experience) the same
decline. More probably, the decline would fall disproportionately on
less-established firms. Well-established firms, whose funds are
oversubscribed before the crash, should still be able to raise new
capital, albeit less of it and on less good terms. Less well-established
firms, which in good times depend upon the overflow from their more
senior counterparts, would be left without funds. If this is the case, or
if this is thought to be the case, then well-established firms still have
reputations to protect. These firms remain in a multiperiod game.
The less well-established firms may realize, however, that they are in
the final period of their game.
Our agency hypothesis, amended to reflect the distinction ex-
plained, would predict that less well-established firms may have been
more aggressive in raising and investing funds and in bidding up
20011
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
investment in late 2000. Other factors might support this same result.
For example, partners in less well-established firms will not have
enjoyed huge returns from prior investments and will be "hungrier"
to maintain their current income. This may be particularly true of
partners who have come from another occupation (such as law) and
given up stable and substantial incomes. Partners in well-established
venture capital firms, in contrast, will have considerable wealth and
may place a higher value on quality-of-life concerns, and welcome the
hiatus they receive from reducing current investments.
Well-established firms may also differ from newer firms by in-
vestor characteristics. Well-established firms may have sophisticated
long-term investors; newer firms may have less sophisticated
investors, who are more likely to leave the sector in the event of a
downturn. This client mix would make it more likely that newer
established firms would behave as if they were in a one-period rather
than multiperiod game.
Exactly how one would define or measure "pushing the enve-
lope" or "behaving as if one were in a one-period game" is a difficult
issue. The year 2000 was a banner year for venture capital invest-
ment. It was certainly not the case that well-established venture
capital firms sat out 2000. One possibility, though, is that well-
established firms raised and invested a much smaller proportion of
available funds than did newer firms. This is consistent with a
statement of a junior partner of one of the most well-established
firms. "We could have easily raised and invested $5 billion dollars
last year," the partner reported, "but we invested less than a billion.
We didn't feel we could profitably invest the rest. My guess is that
other firms just took all they could get. '36
There is also some anecdotal support for the theory that quality-
of-life concerns influenced investment. A few months ago, one well-
established firm, Crosspoint Ventures, cancelled plans for a limited
partnership which had already been oversubscribed.37 Reasons for
36. The fact that less well-established firms were more aggressive in investing and even the
fact that such firms knowingly made investments with lower ex ante returns than those made by
more established firms would be consistent with this version of the agency hypothesis but would
also be consistent with other explanations. For example, the less well-established firms may
charge investors less: they may require lower fees, lower carry or lower minimum investments.
37. Carol Emert, VC Mavericks: Crosspoint Venture Partner Puts Forth Some Provocative
Views on Investing, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 4, 2001, at D-5, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/02/04/BU173880.DTL.
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the cancellation included the desire of general partners to reduce
workload.38
C. Extensions and Limitations of the Agency Hypothesis
In our analysis, the agency hypothesis is presented against a
backdrop of poor returns and used to provide a partial explanation of
those returns. A more generalized statement of the hypothesis is that
reputation alone may not be an adequate check on venture capitalist
opportunism. The cost of lost reputation after a down period may be
minimized by the decline in investments. Thus, the hypothesis might
offer insight into the ex ante incentives created by the relationship
between investors and venture capitalists, even if the most recent
downturn is attributable to other factors.
One final limitation of the agency hypothesis is that agency costs
cannot explain why investment dollars became more readily available
during the late 1990s. The first-level answer to that question is that
money became more available because returns had been stellar, but
that leaves unanswered the question as to why investors themselves
did not realize that increased investment would reduce future returns.
All the agency cost hypothesis can answer is the question of why
venture capitalists did not defer raising capital when funds were
plentiful but returns were expected to be poor.
D. Comparison with Finance Literature
1. LBO Analogy
The boom-bust in venture capital-backed investments is similar
in many ways to the earlier boom-bust in leveraged buy-outs
("LBO"). Investments in LBOs increased from $1 billion in 1980 to a
high of $60 billion in 1988, only to fall back down to $4 billion two
years later. As might be expected, the supply of funds lagged returns;
investments increased when returns on prior investments were high
and fell when prior investment returns turned negative. The LBOs
were funded by limited partnerships, and these partnerships were
funded by institutional investors. Some of the investors in LBOs later
became leading investors in venture capital partnerships, and the
38. Id. The cancellation came after the valuation peak but well above current values; it is
possible therefore, that at the time of the cancellation, valuations were no longer perceived
excessive.
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analogy between LBO investments and venture investments is often
remarked upon by institutional investment managers.
The causes of the LBO boom-bust are the subject of a paper by
Steven Kaplan and Jeremy Stein.3 9 They examined LBO pricing,
capital structure and management incentive structure throughout the
1980s. They found that as the decade wore on, deals got more
expensive, the capital structure got riskier and managers withdrew
more in fees and equity. Among a cross section of investments at any
time, they also found increases in the price, riskiness of capital
structure, and management withdrawals were positively correlated
with subsequent financial distress. They found the data most
consistent with a hypothesis that an overheated phenomenon had
taken hold of the LBO market. They rejected what they character-
ized as the alternative hypothesis that increased liquidity in the asset
market made high prices, debt-laden capital structure and lower
managerial equity economically rational. They also rejected the
theory that subsequent financial distress was due to unforeseen
exogenous shocks to the economy.
In explicating the overheated market hypothesis, Kaplan and
Stein discuss the role of agents. Even more so than the bankers,
other interested parties are also successful in extracting money from
the deals up front. Ostensibly well-informed players such as manage-
ment, buyout promoters, and investment bankers are increasingly
able to earn compensation simply for completing a transaction, rather
than having their fortunes ride on its eventual success or failure.
Thus, instead of providing a system of checks and balances, these
"smart money" participants may be quite eager to go along, even with
deals that they view as precarious.
It should be apparent that the story Kaplan and Stein detail
about the LBO craze is similar to that offered under our agency cost
hypothesis. One significant difference between our paper and theirs
is that we provide a theory on why smart money participants may find
it rational to collect fees and "go along" rather than buck trends and
gain reputation. The smart money participants believe they are closer
to a one-period game than a multiperiod game.
39. Steven N. Kaplan and Jeremy C. Stein, The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial
Structure in the 1980s, 108 Q.J. ECON. 313 (1993).
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2. Finance Literature on Venture Capital
Our agency cost hypothesis is also broadly consistent with the
finance literature on venture capital. As noted above, the literature
on the subject emphasizes the ways in which the legal and organi-
zation structure minimizes agency costs. Agency costs are not
deemed eradicated, however, and a number of scholars have
described existing costs at some length. Of particular interest is the
work Paul Gompers did on the decision of a venture capital firm to
take a company public prematurely-a practice he called
"grandstanding." 4  Gompers found that as opposed to well-
established venture capital funds, younger, less-established venture
capitalists take companies public earlier.41 They sit on the board for
briefer periods of time prior to going public, 42 have smaller equity
stakes in these companies, 43 and are more likely to have the timing of
the public offering fall shortly before the introduction of a new fund.
44
Significantly, Gompers found that the public offerings of these
younger firms are more underpriced at the time of the offering than
those of better-established firms. These findings support Gompers's
hypothesis that less-established firms sacrifice value in order to show
the market a success story in the form of a public offering. This is
designed to increase investment in their forthcoming fund. Gompers
concludes that the lure of additional investment for less well-
established venture capital firms causes the funds to represent current
investors poorly.45 Gompers recommends a shift toward contingent
compensation, the carry, and away from fixed management fees.46
Our hypothesis here is somewhat similar: the lure of additional
capital causes venture capitalists to misrepresent the investors
40. Gompers, supra note 9, at 134.
41. Id. at 139-41.
42. Id. at 147-50.
43. Id. at 138, 150-53
44. Id. at 146-47.
45. An alternative explanation is that second-tier venture capitalists may discount the price
of their services to reflect the fact that the venture capitalists will sacrifice value to gain market
share. The discount may be in the form of reduced fees, reduced carry, or reduced minimum
investment requirements. Investors may not suffer a reduced return, and the practice-
sacrificing return to increase market share-may be consistent with an efficient market.
46. Gompers fails to mention that decision making would be distorted even with 100
percent contingent compensation, provided that the present value risk adjusted incremental
return from new funds outweighs the cost to the venture capitalist, in the form of reduced
"carry," from mistiming the public offering. The distortion would be reduced, however, because
more of the return would be in the form of carry. The venture capitalist would thus bear more
of the costs from mistiming the public offering.
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supplying that capital. Reducing the fixed portion of venture capital
compensation, as suggested by Gompers, would reduce this problem
as well. It would not eliminate agency costs because the venture
capitalist would still get a free option in the form of the carry.
In Gompers's model, established venture capitalists have no
incentive to mistime public offerings because the reputational gain
from doing so is slight: they already have success stories. It is
possible, though not mentioned by Gompers, that established venture
capitalists also suffer a reputational loss from mistiming public
offerings.
E. Emotional Connection to Portfolio Companies
We have thus far dealt with a possible nonalignment of monetary
incentives between investors and venture capitalists. There may be
nonmonetary factors that have the same effect, at least with respect to
follow-up funding for portfolio companies. An entrepreneur typically
meets with the venture capitalist from a given firm who specializes in
the relevant sector or technology. If the meeting goes well, that
venture capitalist will recommend the investment to his or her
partners. Once a company is funded, the same venture capitalist will
represent the venture capital firm on the board of the start-up. If the
management team is inexperienced, the venture capitalist may be
intimately involved in day-to-day operations. The staggered nature of
financing means that for any venture capitalist a substantial portion of
expenditures are on follow-up financing for portfolio companies.
Any cutbacks necessarily reduce this funding, and a company that is
not funded by its lead venture capitalist will generally not find any
other sources of funding. Venture capitalists described closing off
funding as the worst part of their job. "It's very painful to let
companies shut down; by then you've become the entrepreneur's best
friend and confidant." "You are emotionally involved," said another
venture capitalist. "You can see why a lot of people aren't willing to
say 'no' [to follow-up financing]."
Emotional ties to portfolio companies are a constant in venture
capital and therefore cannot directly explain overinvestment at a time
when valuations were high. Indeed, at a time of high valuations it
may be more likely that existing companies will receive follow-up
funding without significant support from the lead investor from the
prior round. Emotional ties to portfolio companies may, however,
comprise one of many reasons why it is difficult to correct a course of
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overinvestment. As the market deteriorates, portfolio companies
become more and more dependent upon their current venture
capitalist, raising the dynamic described above.
The discussion of follow-up funding of portfolio companies is
related to the discussion of the follow-up funding in Part II. There,
we hypothesized that failure to provide follow-up funding would
reduce a venture capitalist's reputation among entrepreneurs and
technologically skilled employees. The venture capitalist acts to
preserve her reputation and the reputational benefits are shared with
repeat investors in later funds. Here, we treat the funding simply as
imposing an agency cost. The venture capitalist acts out of a sense of
duty and affection to preserve the jobs of employees. Investors do
not share in the payoffs to this action.47
Emotional ties to portfolio companies may also explain differing
investment patterns within venture capital. In the past, venture
capitalists diversified their portfolio by seeking other companies to
provide the bulk of follow-up funding to existing portfolio companies
and by providing follow-up funding to portfolio companies of other
venture capitalists. Now that the market has fallen precipitously, a
much greater percentage of follow-up funding is going to a venture
capitalist's own portfolio companies. More likely, though, changing
investment patterns have multiple causes, and for that reason are a
subject for a different paper.
CONCLUSION
Our interviews with venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and
industry lawyers reveal that the motivations behind high valuation
investments in 2000 are complex. Firms may have felt valuations
were not high in general, or not high for the investments they made.
Firms may have felt that investment decisions were that of their
limited partners, and their role was merely to optimize returns subject
to those decisions. Firms may have invested to retain reputation, with
reputational gains accruing to the firm and its long-term repeat
47. We can treat the reputational investment vis-A-vis entrepreneurs and skilled employees
as a form of agency cost as well-if we assume that current investors will not participate in later
investments. The most logical reason to think current investors will not participate is outlined
above: investment after the crash will be low. But if subsequent investment is low, it is unclear
why venture capitalists, who under this hypothesis no longer care much about reputation among
investors, would sacrifice current return to maintain reputation among entrepreneurs and
employees.
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investors. Herd behavior may explain why behavior is "sticky" and
firms didn't change their behavior as valuations rose.
Agency cost theories look to the wedge between venture capi-
talist and investor interest caused by the fixed management fees, and,
to a lesser extent, the "free" option value of the profits interest.
Agency theories rely critically on the assumption that venture
capitalists had private knowledge that future investment flows were
apt to be lower than 2000 investment. This turned a multiperiod
game into something approaching a one-period game, and some
venture capitalists behaved accordingly. Agency costs are most likely
to form part of the explanation for less well-established firms. Such
firms have less reputational capital to risk, and have an investor base
that is less sophisticated and less likely to make new investments after
a downturn in the market.
